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Good Faith Purchase and Warehouse
Receipts: Thoughts on the Interplay
of Articles 2, 7, and 9 of the UCC
By JOHN F. DOLAN*
In Articles 2, 7, and 9, the Uniform Commercial Code' weaves a
complex pattern for resolving the commercial confrontation between
secured parties and commodity paper purchasers. The pattern rests on
the commercial doctrine of good-faith purchase2 and the related theo-
ries of estoppel, negotiability, and buyer in ordinary course. In addi-
tion, the distinction between buyers and lenders, that is, the distinction
between the marketing and the financing functions of documents of
title, supports the framework of these rules. Generally, courts have
failed to perceive the structure established by the Code. They often ap-
ply Article 9 to situations governed by Article 7, and demonstrate a
lack of awareness of the critical role of Article 2 and the doctrine of
good-faith purchase.
In an attempt to alleviate confusion and to demonstrate the integ-
rity of the present structure, this Article posits the following proposi-
tions. First, "qualified holders," those to whom negotiable documents
of title have been duly negotiated, derive their rights as against true
owners and secured parties from Article 7, although Article 7 some-
times defers to Article 9 in this regard. Second, Article 7 posits a gen-
eral rule that "nonqualified holders" of documents of title, whether
negotiable or nonnegotiable, take no better interest than their transfer-
ors held or had actual authority to convey. This general rule, how-
ever, is subject to the operation of various buyer protection provisions
of Articles 2, 7, and 9, and therefore courts must determine whether the
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University.
The author gratefully acknowledges that Professor Ray D. Henson of Hastings College
of the Law and Carl Funk of the Pennsylvania Bar read and commented upon an early draft
of this Article. By extending that courtesy to the author, they have not in any way become
responsible for the conclusions expressed here.
1. Hereinafter referred to as "Code." All sections and comment references, unless
otherwise noted, are to the 1972 Official Version of the Uniform Commercial Code.
2. See generally Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE
L.J. 1057 (1954); Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 469 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Warren].
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nonqualified holder is a buyer or lender. Third, nonqualified holders
who are lenders derive their rights from Article 9. Finally, this Article
contends that courts frustrate the Code's attempt to strike a proper bal-
ance among the competing interests by failing to accord due deference
to the doctrine of estoppel in documentary transactions. Because these
questions arise most frequently in the context of warehouse receipts,
the inquiry must begin with a consideration of warehouse-receipt
transactions.
Functions of the Warehouse Receipt 3
Historically, documents of title such as warehouse receipts facili-
tated the practice of storing and transporting commodities. More re-
cently, the receipt has taken on significant marketing and financing
features.
The Marketing Function4
For some purchasers, delivery is not an essential part of the
purchase transaction. Grain dealers, for example, frequently purchase
from producers and sell to industry consumers without moving the
grain from the elevators to which the producers delivered it for drying
and storing after harvest. Customarily these buyers and sellers effect
such transfers by negotiable warehouse receipts. The producer obtains
the receipt, which describes the grain according to industry standards;
the grain dealer then purchases the receipt and transfers it, perhaps
through a series of buyers, to a buyer who desires to ship or otherwise
take possession of the grain. This last purchaser then surrenders the
receipt to the elevator and takes delivery. The result is that the parties
have achieved the marketing of the grain without incurring unneces-
sary transportation expenses.
Similarly, in the cotton industry a producer will deliver cotton to a
gin for processing and storing. The gin will issue a negotiable receipt
for the cotton with a sample attached. Brokers then display the sam-
ples to buyers who may be located in markets distant from the gin.
Upon receipt of a satisfactory offer, the broker forwards the receipt
with a draft through banking channels. When the purchaser honors
the draft the bank delivers the receipt; the purchaser, unless he desires
3. See generally Britton, Negotiable Documents of Title, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 103, 104,
106-09 (1954).
4. See generally Farnsworth, Documentary Drafts Under the Unform Commercial
Code, 84 BANKING L.J. 189 (1967), reprinted in 22 Bus. LAW. 479 (1967).
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to resell the cotton without taking possession, will surrender the receipt
to the gin and take delivery of the goods. Again, the receipt simplifies
the marketing process and saves transportation costs.
The Financing Functions
In transactions similar to the foregoing illustrations, market condi-
tions or production schedules may force a buyer to hold a commodity.
During that interval the buyer owns a valuable asset but cannot utilize
it and, therefore, may seek to borrow against it. Lenders will grant
credit on the security of the stored commodity by taking the negotiable
warehouse receipt. When the borrower finds a buyer for the commod-
ity or is prepared to use it in its own production process, the borrower
will pay off the loan, obtain the receipt from the creditor and surrender
the receipt to the warehouse against delivery of the goods.
Some borrowers use nonnegotiable receipts in connection with in-
ventory financing. This form of inventory loan satisfies a lender's po-
licing requirements in situations in which the lender fears his collateral
may disappear quickly. The borrower delivers the inventory to a
"field warehouse," usually a part of the borrower's premises controlled
by an independent, field-warehouse company. The warehouse then is-
sues nonnegotiable receipts to the lender. When the borrower needs
inventory to fill customer orders, he will satisfy a portion of the loan;
the lender in turn will issue delivery orders to the field warehouse,
which will then release part of the inventory to the borrower.
These models illustrate typical patterns through which business
people employ warehouse receipts to save transaction costs and to
achieve liquidity. The models also forecast the potential conflicts in
these commodity paper transactions. With respect to each purchase,
for example, there is the classic tension between the purchaser, on the
one hand, and the seller's secured lender, on the other. Conflicts be-
tween purchasers and lenders claiming an interest in the same goods
may also arise because some sellers will enter into a contract of sale
with more than one buyer or grant a security interest to more than one
lender.
5. See generaly Skilton, Field Warehousing as a Financing Device: The Warehouseman
Goes to the Storer-Part I, 1961 WIs. L. Rnv. 221; Skilton, Field Warehousing as a Security
Device: The Warehouseman Goes to the Storer-Part I, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 403.
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The Qualified Holder
The Negotiable Receipt and the Qualified Holder
Because the negotiable receipt facilitates the marketing of com-
modities and the use of inventory as collateral for loans, the Code
should protect both of these functions. It does. The principal benefici-
ary of this protection is the qualified holder. Qualification of a holder
for this purpose requires compliance with transfer rules similar to those
for negotiable instruments. The holder must purchase for value, in
good faith, and without notice of any defense or claim;6 bearer docu-
ments need only be delivered, and order documents must be endorsed
as well as delivered. 7
Article 7 imposes the additional requirement that the holder quali-
fies only when the negotiation is in "the regular course of business or
financing."8 This feature of warehouse receipt negotiation knows no
counterpart in negotiable instruments law. The comment to section 7-
501 makes it clear that this requirement is dictated by the mercantile
foundation of the doctrine of good-faith purchase. 9 The Code affords
the benefit of good-faith purchase in commodity paper transactions
only if the setting is strictly commercial. Only a person "in the
trade"' 0 can negotiate such a document and then only in connection
with a transfer commercial in nature. I Most good-faith-purchase sec-
tions of the Code invoke a similar requirement by virtue of their appli-
cation only to sales out of inventory.' 2
This additional regular-course-of-business or financing require-
ment serves to raise the level of good faith imposed on a qualified
holder. Although the good-faith requirement of Article 7 is subjec-
tive, 13 the comments imply persuasively that the commercial feature of
documentary negotiation operates to protect against conduct by a
6. U.C.C. § 7-501(4); cf U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (negotiable instruments rule). The holder,
moreover, must qualify at the time he becomes a holder. See U.C.C. § 7-506; Branch Bank-
ing & Trust Co. v. Gill, 286 N.C. 342, 211 S.E.2d 327 (1975).
7. U.C.C. § 7-501(1); cf U.C.C. § 3-202(1) (negotiable instruments rule).
8. U.C.C. § 7-501(4).
9. U.C.C. § 7-501, comment 1. "The reason for allowing a person, in bad faith or in
error, to convey away rights which are not his own has from the beginning been to make
possible the speedy handling of that great run of commercial transactions which are patently
usual and normal." id See also Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith
Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1060 (1954); Warren, supra note 2, at 484-85.
10. U.C.C. § 7-501, comment 1.
11. "Obviously, the snapping up of goods for quick resale at a price suspiciously below
the market deserves no protection. . . : it is. . . outside the range of regular course." Id.
12. See U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2), 9-307(1).
13. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
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holder which suggests objective bad faith.' 4
A significant benefit accruing to the qualified holder of a negotia-
ble receipt involves the dual marketing and financing features of com-
modity-paper negotiation. It is a conclusion of this Article that certain
good-faith-purchase benefits accrue to nonqualified holders only if
they take as buyers, as opposed to creditors. 15 By specifically referring
to "regular course of business or financing" in section 7-501(4), the
Code makes it clear that this distinction does not operate in the quali-
fied-holder situation. 16 The qualified holder benefits from good-faith-
purchase rules regardless of whether that holder is a buyer or lender.
Furthermore, section 7-502 provides that a qualified holder of a negoti-
able document acquires title to the goods in addition to title to the doc-
ument,17 in contrast to the position of a lender holding a nonnegotiable
receipt, who does not obtain title to the underlying commodity.' 8
In addition, the qualified holder defeats claims to the document
itself and defeats most others who assert an interest in the goods. 19
The qualified holder also benefits from agency and estoppel rules. For
example, qualified holder status will defeat the argument that the
bailor delivered the goods after the bailee issued the receipts. 20 In this
way, section 7-502 codifies the rule of Baldwin v. Childs,2l a leading
pre-Code bill of lading case. This rule is akin to the estoppel by deed
rule of real property law.22 Such estoppel benefits neither accompany
nonnegotiable receipts nor negotiable receipts which are not duly
14. See U.C.C. § 7-501, comment 1, para. 3.
15. See text accompanying notes 112-18 infra. This buyer-creditor distinction is found
elsewhere in the Code. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(9) with U.C.C. § 1-201(32)-(33).
16. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(b) (Article 9 treats in the same fashion those who buy chattel
paper and those who lend against chattel paper). Thus the Code does not distinguish be-
tween buyers and lenders who hold chattel paper or who hold negotiable commodity paper
which has been duly negotiated to them.
17. U.C.C. § 7-502(l)(b). See, eg., R.E. Huntley Cotton Co. v. Fields, 551 S.W.2d 472
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
18. See note 194 infra.
19. "Subject to the following section, title and rights so acquired are not defeated by
any stoppage of the goods represented by the document or by surrender of such goods by the
bailee, and are not impaired even though the negotiation or any prior negotiation consti-
tuted a breach of duty or even though any person has been deprived of possession of the
document by misrepresentation, fraud, accident, mistake, duress, loss, theft, or conversion,
or even though a previous sale or other transfer of the goods or document has been made to
a third person." U.C.C. § 7-502(2).
20. U.C.C. § 7-502(l)(c) and comment 2.
21. 249 N.Y. 212, 163 N.E. 737 (1928).
22. See Goodtitle v. Bailey, 98 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1777).
September 1978]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
negotiated.23
In sum, the qualified holder occupies a highly advantageous posi-
tion.24 Provided the issuing warehouse retains possession of the goods,
the qualified holder need not fear encroachment from buyers, other
secured parties, or attaching creditors. 25 Furthermore, Article 7 extends
these benefits through a shelter provision, which brings subsequent
transferees under the umbrella of the qualified-holder transferor.26
Thus, a transferee who takes from a qualified holder but who does not
take by due negotiation nonetheless enjoys the benefits of qualified
holder status to the extent his transferor enjoyed them.27 Within the
scope of the present inquiry,28 the only real concern for the qualified
holder is the possibility that conflicting rights may have accrued prior
to the time the original holder of the receipt bailed the goods.
The Qualified Holder and Paramount Rights: Section 7-503
The most important feature of the Article 7 system for balancing
security of property interests against open market interests is section 7-
503. In this section the doctrine of good-faith purchase confronts the
tension between the conflicting policies of security of title and free
movement of goods, and section 7-503 initially resolves this conflict in
favor of security of property. The qualified holder and his transferee
take subject to that class of persons identified in section 7-503(1) as
enjoying rights paramount to those of the qualified holder. "A docu-
ment of title confers no right in goods against a person who before
issuance of the document had a legal interest or a perfected security
interest in them ... "29
23. See U.C.C. § 7-504, comments 1 and 2. But see Branch Banking & Trust Co. v.
Gill, 286 N.C. 342, 211 S.E.2d 327 (1975).
24. In infrequent instances, Article 9 permits the qualified holder to surrender posses-
sion without losing his security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-304(5); ef. U.C.C. § 9-304(4) (per-
mitting a security interest in negotiable documents to be perfected without taking
possession). Generally, however, surrender of the document reduces the rights of the trans-
feror to those of a disappointed seller under Article 2. See In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
25. See U.C.C. § 7-602.
26. "A transferee of a document, whether negotiable or nonnegotiable, to whom the
document has been delivered but not duly negotiated, acquires the title and rights which his
transferor had or had actual authority to convey." U.C.C. § 7-504(1) (emphasis added).
27. Cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-403(1), 3-201(1), 8-301(1) (similar provisions for goods, instru-
ments, and securities).
28. There are several Code sections, in addition to those discussed in the text, which
may restrict the rights of the qualified holder and which are beyond the scope of this Article.
See U.C.C. §§ 7-205, 7-207(2), 7-209(3)(a).
29. U.C.C. § 7-503(1); ef U.C.C. § 7-403(3) (persons with paramount rights are the
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The intended application of the rule is most easily illustrated by
the classic "thief' situation. The doctrine that the thief cannot convey
good title30 is a sanction particularly strong with respect to the sale of
goods.31 Section 7-503 supports this principle by refusing to permit a
thief who cannot give good title to the goods themselves to improve the
position of his buyer by bailing the goods and selling the buyer a docu-
ment of title.32 After positing this paramount rights rule, section 7-
503(1) then establishes an exception to it. Although technically leaving
room for the application of the general principle, the exception has so
occupied lawyers and judges as to dominate the principle. The excep-
tion rests on traditional notions of actual authority, apparent authority,
and estoppel. A person with paramount rights falls within the excep-
tion when such person: delivers or entrusts the goods (or document of
title covering them) to a party who becomes the bailor with actual or
apparent authority to bail or power to obtain delivery of the goods; 33
delivers or entrusts the goods (or document of title covering them) with
power to convey good title under either of the open market provisions
in Article 2 (section 2-403) or Article 9 (section 9-307);34 or acquiesces
in the procurement of the document by the person who becomes the
bailor.35 The first two situations cover instances of active delivery and
entrustment; the provision covering acquiescence serves to catch those
who passively allow another to obtain apparent authority to convey.
This exception is nothing more than application of a well-settled legal
notion: 36 the principle that when the conduct of a person contributes
to confusion, that person is precluded from asserting paramount rights
only persons who can obtain goods subject to a negotiable receipt without delivering that
receipt).
30. The rule that a thief can give no title applies except in certain instances when the
thief transfers money or transfers an instrument, document or security in bearer form. A
good faith purchaser who takes from the thief who stole such property may defeat the true
owner. See generally R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.5 (3d ed. 1977).
3 1. The thief rule is the first corollary of the principle that one who has no title cannot
convey title. Nemo dat quinon habet. See Lindsay v. Cundy, 3 App. Cas. 459, 463-64, 47
L.J.Q.B. 481, 483 (H.L. 1878).
32. "A thief of the goods cannot indeed by shipping or storing them to his own order
acquire power to transfer them to a good faith purchaser." U.C.C. § 7-503, comment 1;
accord, 2 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALE OF GOODS § 421 (rev. ed. 1948); Gf.
U.C.C. § 7-209, comment 3 (if the thief bails stolen goods, the true owner is not subject to
the warehouse lien).
33. U.C.C. § 7-503(l)(a).
34. Id.
35. U.C.C. § 7-503(l)(b).
36. "[Flor seeing somebody must be a loser by this deceit, it is more reason that he that
employs and puts a trust and confidence in the deceiver should be a loser, than a stranger
.... " Hem v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (K.B. 1701).
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against the person misled.37
There is a further point that merits attention. Section 7-504(1)
specifies that a nonqualified holder can never take better title via the
warehouse receipt than his transferor "had or had actual authority to
convey. ' ' 38 Clearly, then, as the cross reference in the qualified-holder
provision suggests,39 section 7-503 applies only to holders to whom a
document of title has been duly negotiated, that is, qualified holders.4°
This conclusion is confirmed by the comment to section 7-504(1),
which asserts that any party who is not a qualified holder of a negotia-
ble document derives no benefit from estoppel.4 1 It follows, then, that
only the qualified holder can benefit from the exception of section 7-
503, which is basically an estoppel rule. The estoppel does not apply
to nonnegotiable documents or to nonqualified holders of negotiable
documents. Holders of nonnegotiable documents and nonqualified
holders of negotiable documents lose to the owner or prior secured
party asserting a paramount title under the terms of section 7-504, not
section 7-503.42
The conclusion that the exception to section 7-503 operates to de-
prive the person with paramount rights of those rights in favor of the
qualified holder, finds only mixed support in the cases. Two decisions
which involve nonnegotiable warehouse receipts, and in which, there-
fore, section 7-503 should have no application, state unequivocally that
the estoppel exception of section 7-503 does not deprive the true owner
or prior secured party of paramount rights.43 On the other hand, the
37. This reading of the rule is analogous to the provision of § 7-207(2) which by opera-
tion of law, rather than estoppel, gives qualified holders rights in fungible and commingled
goods when the warehouse overissues receipts. Section 7-207(2), then, deprives the true
owner of part or all of his interest as does § 7-503(1). See 3 NEw YORK LAW REVISION
COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1796-97 (1955).
38. Note, moreover, that the comment explicitly negates any argument that a negotia-
ble document can augment the title of such a transferee. U.C.C. § 7-504, comment 1.
39. Section 7-502 expressly renders the rights of a qualified holder subject to the rule of
§ 7-503.
40. See U.C.C. § 7-503, comment 1.
41. U.C.C. § 7-504, comment 1.
42. That is, holders of nonnegotiable documents and nonqualified holders of negotia-
ble documents lose in all instances when they assert rights as holders of the instument only.
To the extent that they qualify for protection under other rules of the Code they may prevail
over the true owner or prior secured party. See U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2), 9-307(1).
43. "But neither does the Code divest an entruster such as Boody of all its rights, and
no implication that it does so arises from Section 7-503(1)." Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v.
Irving R. Boody Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560, 567 (Arb. Dec. 1963) (Funk, Arb.). "The
Bank incorrectly infers that the reverse is therefore true, and that § 7-503(l) operates to
divest a prior secured party of his security interest if he has done or acquiesced in such acts.
But that is not what the section says. Had the drafters of the Code meant to grant priority to
[Vol. 30
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leading commentators are united in their support of the general pro-
position that those who fall into the estoppel exception thereby lose
their paramount rights.44 The dicta of those two decisions, then,
should not overcome the contrary implications of other authority and
the plain import of the statute.45
The scope of the exception rests not so much on fact situations as it
does on the purpose of the section itself, that is, to preclude the person
with paramount rights from asserting those rights against a qualified
holder when such an assertion smacks of unfairness. Other estoppel
provisions of the Code, and pre-Code law, provide some direction in
defining the boundaries of the exception.
Inventory
The estoppel rule most clearly applies in those situations where the
goods covered by the negotiable documents are part of the bailor's in-
ventory.46 By definition, documents of title represent goods.47 The
estoppel rules for the sale of goods in Article 248 and Article 949 apply
to sales out of inventory. Only the buyer in ordinary course benefits
from those estoppel rules. A buyer in ordinary course is a buyer from
one "in the business of selling goods of that kind,' ' 50 that is, a buyer of
the holder of the document in such a situation, they could have done so in simpler language
than that which was used. They could have spoken affirmatively instead of negatively, and
could have provided simply that: a document of title takes priority over the rights of a per-
son who before issuance had a legal interest or a perfected security interest if such person
either (a) delivered or entrusted the goods, etc., or (b) acquiesced, etc." Douglas-Guardian
Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair Endsley Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 176, 188-89 (W.D. Mich.
1971). In Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Irving R. Boody Co., I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560 (Arb.
Dec. 1963) (Funk, Arb.), the arbitrator concluded that § 7-503(1) implies only that the
holder gets "some" rights and that the Code defines these rights elsewhere than in § 7-503.
This position is theoretically correct in that the Code does define these rights in the preced-
ing section, § 7-502, which is, however, subject to § 7-503; and if § 7-503 does not apply
because of the entrusting or acquiescing exceptions, § 7-502 does. Under § 7-502, the quali-
fied holder gets title to the document and title to the goods free from all claims.
44. R. BRAUCHER, DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 62-65 (1958); 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY IN-
TERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 6.6, at 173 n.6 (1965); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 700-01 (1972); Warren, supra
note 2, at 486.
45. See United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 814 n.34 (5th Cir. 1971).
46. The inventory, that is, not in the narrow Article 9 definition of the term, see U.C.C.
§ 9-109(4), but in the broader and commonly accepted use of the term. Thus bailed farm
products, though arguably not inventory, see U.C.C. § 9-109(3), should be considered inven-
tory for the purposes of this discussion.
47. U.C.C. § 1-201(15).
48. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
49. U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
50. U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
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inventory.5' Reference in section 7-503 to Article 9 should, in Profes-
sor Gilmore's judgment, leave no doubt that the estoppel rule of section
7-503 applies to inventory. "The cross reference to § 9-307 means...
that there is nothing a secured party can do to protect himself against
the contingency of a fraudulently procured document with respect to
collateral which is inventory held by a debtor for sale .... -52
The requirement that due negotiation of a document of title in-
cludes establishing that the transfer is in the regular course of business
supports the same conclusion. A transfer of a document of title cover-
ing goods by one who regularly deals in goods of the kind goes far to
show the transfer to be in the regular course of business. Clearly, then,
entrustment and delivery of inventory are prime situations for applica-
tion of the estoppel rule; but, unlike the estoppel rules of Articles 2 and
9, there are more situations under Article 7 that benefit from the estop-
pel principle.
Finance
Documents of title figure in more than the marketing of goods.
Due negotiation of such documents includes not just transfers in the
regular course of business but transfers in the regular course of finance
as well. The inventory limit of the Article 2 and Article 9 good-faith-
purchase provisions cannot serve as a restriction on the estoppel rule of
Article 7, as it does on the analogous rules of those other articles. Doc-
uments of title serve important financing functions. In the regular
course of finance they come into the hands of brokers, banks, and other
investors who do not necessarily deal in the commodities the docu-
ments represent. In this sense documents of title are more like negotia-
ble instruments and securities whose estoppel rules do not feature an
inventory element. 53 Because documents of title serve both market
and finance functions, entrusting goods or documents to one who deals
in such commodities will provide an appropriate setting for invoking
the estoppel rule of section 7-503. Similarly, entrusting goods or docu-
ments to one who regularly engages in financing transactions involving
such documents may also give rise to an estoppel argument.
Knowledge
In either event, the question arises whether the estoppel applies if
the entruster does not know or does not have reason to know the busi-
51. See U.C.C. § 9-109, comment 3.
52. 2 G. Gilmore, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 25.4, at 666 (1965).
53. See U.C.C. §§ 3-405, 3-406, 4-406, 8-205, 8-206, 8-311.
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ness of the entrustee. Code provisions are silent on this point. Two
cases suggest that such knowledge is a prerequisite to estoppel.
5 4
Other authority posits a knowledge requirement in the analogous rules
of section 2-403(2)55 and section 7-205.56
Professor Warren criticizes the addition of this requirement.5 7 He
asserts that the introduction of the knowledge requirement invites in-
quiry into the entruster's state of mind. Courts traditionally have re-
fused to pursue that inquiry in questions involving negotiable
instruments.58 These cases reason that the trouble of ascertaining the
state of mind of a drawer or maker seriously hampers the certainty
element which is critical to the success of negotiable instruments. It is
enough, this reasoning holds, that the form of the instrument is negoti-
able; the drawer's unawareness of that fact is immaterial.
Professor Warren's view is more persuasive in the realm of negoti-
able instruments than in the realm of fungible goods. The dangers of
uncertainty are considerably less severe in the former situation; it is far
more difficult for an entruster to claim a lack of knowledge of the busi-
ness of the entrustee than it is for the drawer to claim a lack of appreci-
ation of the significance of negotiable language. The entruster alleging
a lack of knowledge, moreover, must shoulder the burden of proof.59
Finally, the knowledge requirement reflects the equitable origins of
these estoppel rules and recognizes the unfairness of charging a deliv-
ery with free market implications when the entruster has no reason to
know that he is delivering to one in a position to deal with good faith
purchasers. While it may be argued that a careful entruster will al-
ways be more able than the good faith purchaser to avoid this type of
situation, the fact remains that an entruster may not know all facets of
an entrustee's business affairs. Moreover, a rule which deprives the
innocent, unknowing entruster of title may strike courts as unduly
54. United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 814-15 n.34 (5th Cir. 1971); Porter v. Wertz, 23
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 614 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); f Lundy v. Greenville Bank & Trust Co., 179
Miss. 282, 174 So. 802 (1937) (pre-Code) (true owner estopped when he should have known
that broker was dealing with his receipts); Fourth Nat'l Bank v. St. Louis Cotton Compress
Co., I 1 Mo. App. 333 (1882) (pre-Code) (true owner should have known factor was borrow-
ing on receipts).
55. Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc. 2d 168, 171, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 400, 404
(Civ. Ct. 1967).
56. R. BRAUCHER, DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 66 (1958).
57. Warren, supra note 2, at 473-74.
58. See generally W. BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES § 130
(2d ed. 1961).
59. First Nat'l Bank of Fleming v. Petzoldt, 262 F.2d 540, 545 (10th Cir. 1958).
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harsh and may invite troublesome exceptions. On balance, then, com-
mercial lawyers might do well to accept the knowledge requirement.
Pre-Code Authority
In addition to these general guidelines, pre-Code commercial cases
and statutes illustrate the way in which the estoppel rule of section 7-
503 should operate. In the nineteenth century, factors who undertook
to sell a producer's goods played a chief role in the marketing of com-
modities.60 At an early date, the common law recognized the utility of
protecting good faith purchasers who did business with such factors.
Accordingly, the common law clothed such buyers with good title even
though the factor exceeded his authority.61 The courts adhered, how-
ever, to a rigid distinction which denied similar protection to pledgees;
it was the general rule at common law that a factor could not pledge
absent his principal's authority.62 Legislatures overcame this distinc-
tion with the early 63 factors acts, which obliterated that distinction and
gave factors authority to pledge.64 Other provisions in the factors
acts,65 the Uniform Sales Act,66 and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act 67 made it clear that by entrusting a negotiable document to a fac-
tor, the true owner empowered the factor to sell or pledge the goods or
the document.68
The adoption of the Code and the repeal of the uniform acts
should not be viewed as a retreat from these efforts to promote the
cause of commercial celerity. The language of section 7-503(l)(a)
60. A factor was one who dealt for his principal and also held the goods. He was
different from a broker who did not hold the goods. F. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT § 24, at 64 (2d ed. 1924).
61. See L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 73, at 368-70 (2d ed. 1959); cf.
U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (a secured party who authorizes the sale of goods by the debtor thereby
loses his security interest in the collateral upon that sale).
62. Stevens v. Wilson, 6 Hill 512 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844); Price v. Wisconsin Marine &
Fire Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 267, 277 (1877) (dictum). See generally J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF AGENCY § 113 (9th ed. 1882).
63. These early acts, unlike more recent factors' lien acts patterned on the New York
statute, deal with factors who operate in a merchandising capacity, not as lenders. See N.Y.
PERS. PROP. LAW § 45 (repealed 1964).
64. See, e.g., Factors Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 45, § 2(1).
65. See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 43(l) (repealed 1964).
66. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 32(b) (superseded by U.C.C. 1951).
67. UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT § 40; ef UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACT §
31 (which achieves the same result for bills of lading).
68. See, e.g., Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 239 U.S.
520, 525 (1916); James v. Meriwether Graham Oliver Co., 152 Tenn. 528, 279 S.W. 390
(1926). See also Gazzola v. Lacy Bros. & Kimball, 156 Tenn. 229, 299 S.W. 1039 (1927).
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which brings one who entrusts "with actual or apparent authority to
ship, store or sell" within the estoppel rule and the reference in the
comment to factors and to the early factors acts demonstrate that the
drafters were mindful of these efforts and were conforming section 7-
503 to them.6 9 Section 7-503 continues the established principle that
one who entrusts a document of title to a merchant who deals in the
goods70 or entrusts the goods themselves to such a merchant71 will be
estopped to allege paramount rights.
These, however, are easy cases. Similarly, it is easy to state the
rule that a thief cannot bind the true owner 72 and that a document
procured by a thief can carry no title to the qualified holder.73 There
underlies these clear rules a broad range of factual settings which pro-
vide fertile ground for the imaginative litigant. One who deals, for
example, with the dishonest employee of a true owner can find pre-
Code precedent 74 and analogous rules in the article on commercial pa-
per75 to support a claim that the case does not fall within the thief rule
but is instead a candidate for the operation of estoppel.
Similarly equivocal is the farm landlord situation. The tenant de-
livers crops to a warehouse in return for negotiable warehouse receipts
and then negotiates them. At first blush it seems harsh to estop the
landlord from asserting his crop lien,76 and courts have traditionally
69. "On the other hand, where goods are delivered to a factor for sale, even though the
factor has made no advances and is limited in his duty to sell for cash, the goods are 'en-
trusted' to him 'with actual... authority... to sell' under subsection (1)(a), and if he
procures a negotiable document of title he can transfer the owner's interest to a purchaser by
due negotiation. Further, where the factor is in the business of selling, goods entrusted to
him simply for safekeeping or storage may be entrusted under circumstances which give him
'apparent authority to ship, store or sell' under subsection (1)(a), or power of disposition
under Section 2-403, 7-205 or 9-307, or under a statute such as the earlier Factors Acts, or
under a rule of law giving effect to apparent ownership. See Section 1-103."
U.C.C. § 7-503, comment 1.
70. See, eg., Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Canal-Louisiana Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 239
U.S. 520 (1916); State Bank v. Waterhouse, 70 Conn. 76, 38 A. 904 (1897); Roland M. Baker
Co. v. Brown, 214 Mass. 196, 100 N.E. 1025 (1913).
71. See, e.g., Arbuthnot v. Central Trust Co. (In re Richheimer), 221 F. 16 (7th Cir.),
ceri. denied, 238 U.S. 624 (1915).
72. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra; cf. Wheelwright v. Depeyster, I
Johns. 471, 3 Am. Dec. 345 (N.Y. 1806) (where the buyer traced title from a pirate).
73. Lineburger Bros. v. Hodge, 212 Miss. 204, 54 So. 2d 268 (1951).
74. See, eg., Flexner v. Meyer's Ex'x, 191 Ky. 133, 229 S.W. 99 (1921).
75. The fictitious payee rule of§ 3-405(l)(c) precludes an employer from asserting that
the signature of an indorser is forged when the employer puts the employee in a position to
commit or facilitate the forgery. Cf. § 4-406 which requires a checking account customer to
use reasonable care and promptness in examining account statements or be precluded from
asserting that a signature on a check was forged.
76. The landlord's lien is a creature of statute, which usually does not require the filing
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displayed a stubborn reluctance to preclude the landlord from asserting
that lien against purchasers.77 That reluctance parallels the even
stronger common-law tradition of protecting farm creditors from buy-
ers in the open market.78 The Code continues that protection for farm
creditors79 but not for landlords. The tenant cannot defeat the land-
lord's interest "merely by wrongfully shipping or storing . . . the
crop[s]," but, "knowledge of the likelihood of storage or shipment with
no objection or effort to control it is sufficient to defeat" the landlord's
rights.80 Custom, usage of trade, and reasonable expectations, there-
fore, will play a role in determining whether the qualified holder
defeats the landlord's lien.
Cleveland v. McNabb8 1 confronted one court with an opportunity
to weigh the propriety of invoking estoppel in a farm-landlord situa-
tion. The Commodity Credit Corporation loaned money to a farmer
and took negotiable warehouse receipts covering the farmer's crops
grown on real estate owned by the plaintiffs. Tennessee's crop lien
statute gave the plaintiffs a lien superior to those of a buyer. The
Commodity Credit Corporation and the codefendant argued that by
not exercising control over the farmer, the plaintiffs "acquiesced" in
the procurement of the document. The evidence indicated that the
landlords lived a considerable distance from the farm82 and left the
cultivating and marketing of the crops to their tenant, apparently rely-
ing either on his honesty to remit their rent or upon their lien under the
crop lien statute. The Commodity Credit Corporation evidently con-
tended that section 7-503 would operate to preclude these plaintiffs
from asserting their lien. A second defendant, who purchased crops
directly and not by warehouse receipt, argued common law estoppel.
Rejecting the common law estoppel argument,8 3 the court opted
of any notice. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 31 (1975). Such liens are excluded from
the coverage of Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-104(b).
77. Cf. Layng v. Stout, 155 Wis. 553, 145 N.W. 227 (1914) (landlords successfully as-
serted claim to ownership of crop).
78. See, e.g., Partridge v. Minnesota & Dakota Elev. Co., 75 Minn. 496, 78 N.W. 85
(1899).
79. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1), which contains an exception for the sale of farm products.
80. U.C.C. § 7-503, comment 1.
81. 312 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
82. The farm was situated in Fayette County, Tennessee. Plaintiffs, a doctor and his
wife, lived in Cleveland, Ohio.
83. "In examining the statute, we find nowhere therein an indication that a landlord
must exercise control or supervision over crops grown on his land, or that he must at any
point take possession of them, and the defendants have not cited any statutory or other
reference for such a proposition." Cleveland v. McNabb, 312 F. Supp. 155, 158-59 (W.D.
Tenn. 1970).
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for the statutory lien and against the open market emphasis expressed
by the Code. The court avoided the thrust of section 7-503 by finding
the Commodity Credit Corporation to be a nonqualified holder. The
evidence showed that the records of the corporation reflected the lease.
The warehouse receipts, moreover, referred to gin tickets which de-
scribed the real estate on which the crop grew. Even though the
farmer told the corporation's clerk who took the receipts that there was
no lien, the court concluded that the corporation was charged with the
knowledge which comparision of the lease and the gin tickets would
have yielded. Yet the opinion nowhere indicates that the corporation
had possession of those tickets. The court held further that such
knowledge was sufficient to prevent the corporation from becoming a
qualified holder and therefore prevented it from relying on the estoppel
rule of section 7-503 to defeat the landlords.84
It is difficult to accept the court's reasoning. Assuming that the
corporation should be charged with knowledge that it could have
gleaned from the receipt, lease, and gin tickets (which is assuming a
great deal), the court goes on to assume that such facts would include
knowledge that the tenant did not pay rent to the plaintiff. In the ab-
sence of any specific evidence that the defendants had information that
the tenant was not paying rent, the court seems to place the burden of
investigating the business affairs of the farmer on the party claiming
qualified-holder status. Such a requirement would be clearly contrary
to the entire concept of due negotiation: "the speedy handling of that
great run of commercial- transactions which are patently usual and
normal."8 5
It is clear from the flavor of the court's opinion that it reached its
result because of the strong language in the crop lien statute favoring
landlords over buyers. It is regrettable that the court did not balance
that policy against the contrary and equally strong expression of policy
in the Code, a more recent statute.86 Certainly the court should have
questioned the policy of favoring these plaintiffs who permitted the
84. But see R.E. Huntley Cotton Co. v. Fields, 551 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
"Although the plaintiffs presented some evidence that the defendants had access to informa-
tion sufficient to put them on notice of claims to the cotton, that knowledge is immaterial
unless defendants had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would amount to
bad faith." Id. at 476.
85. U.C.C. § 7-501, comment 1.
86. The crop lien statute originated, according to the brief of one of the defendants, in
the "pastoral 1800's." Cleveland v. McNabb, 312 F. Supp. 155, 158 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
Tennessee adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in 1963. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-101
(1964).
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goods to enter the stream of commerce and then expected the loss to
fall upon the buyer. It is equally obvious that the court was far more
willing to require diligence on the part of the corporation but to coun-
tenance the lack of it on the part of the landlords, who were in the best
position to avoid the conflict. It does not seem unreasonable, further-
more, to draw the conclusion that the court was in fact aware of the
policy direction expressed in section 7-503(l)(a) and its accompanying
comments. Awareness of this policy would explain the court's rather
tortuous effort to find that the defendants were not qualified holders.
Had the court found otherwise, section 7-503(l)(a) would have pro-
vided a compelling argument against the crop-lien statute.
In United States v. Hext87 another court preferred the open-mar-
ket approach. The Farmer's Home Administration, a perfected se-
cured party, sued various defendants involved in the marketing of
cotton originally owned by the government's borrower. The borrower
delivered the cotton to its own gin company, which ginned the cotton
and delivered it to a warehouse for compressing. The warehouse com-
pressed the cotton and stored it, issuing a negotiable warehouse receipt
for each bail to the gin company in its own name or in the name of the
borrower. The gin company sent samples of the cotton to a broker
who offered the cotton for sale by sample.
The dangers of imposing strict security of property principles to
this arrangement are readily apparent: if the security interest of the
government prevails, each of the parties dealing with the receipts is
liable in conversion. 88 Finding the defendants liable would be inimical
to the fundamental open market concepts of the Code, since it would
tend to inhibit marketing of products that serve as collateral in a se-
cured transaction.
The court turned instead to common law estoppel theories, hold-
ing that because the government knew that the farmer operated the gin,
it was precluded from asserting its lien.89 The court noted further that
application of Article 7 would yield a similar result. Because the gov-
ernment had "entrusted" this grower with the cotton with apparent au-
thority to store it, the court concluded that Article 7 precluded the
government from asserting its lien. The court also held that the gov-
ernment's conduct amounted to acquiescence in the issuance of the
87. 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971).
88. In Hext, the Government sued the grower, the gin, the warehouse, and the broker.
The conversion liability rests on the common law tort of innocent intermeddling. See
U.C.C. § 7-704, comment.
89. 444 F.2d at 814.
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warehouse receipt. In either event, the preclusion rule of section 7-
503(1) operates and the secured party loses its priority.90
In sum, the general rule of section 7-503 that a true owner or se-
cured party whose interest arises before the issuance of a negotiable
document enjoys rights paramount to those of the qualified holder is
subject to the far-reaching estoppel exception contained in the same
section. While pre-Code history provides some direction, the scope of
the section is vague and therefore provides fertile ground for character-
ization and advocacy. The purpose of section 7-503 is to balance the
interests of the two relatively innocent parties, the party with prior
rights and the qualified holder, by having the burden fall on the one
who had the best opportunity to avoid the problem. In construing the
scope of the estoppel rules, courts should bear in mind the cardinal rule
of Code construction: the purpose of the section controls.91 The pur-
* pose of section 7-503, also, is to facilitate commerce by showing a pref-
erence for the qualified holder over the owner or prior secured party
where the latter has allowed another to act to introduce goods into the
stream of commerce. Consequently, the courts should restrict their in-
quiry to whether the one party is a qualified holder and whether the
other party has so acted.
The Interplay of Articles 7 and 9 with Respect to Qualified Holders
Some confusion emanates from the Hext case and elsewhere over
the proper role of Article 9 buyer-protection rules with respect to nego-
tiable receipts and qualified holders. In ruling against the secured
party in Hext, the court cited section 9-309 and the leading nonnegoti-
able receipts arbitration case, Philadelphia National Bank v. Irving A
Boody Co.92 The court thereby implies that the provision of section 9-
309 might govern the paramount rights situation;93 that is, that Article
9, rather than Article 7, should resolve conflicts between prior secured
parties and the qualified holder. The Boody opinion, using language
in the nature of dictum, expressly comes to this conclusion. 94
90. Id. at 814 n.34.
91. See U.C.C. § 1-102, comment 1.
92. 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560 (Arb. Dec. 1963) (Funk, Arb.). See Funk, Trust Receipt vs.
Warehouse Recept- Which Prevails When They Cover the Same Goods?, 19 Bus. LAW. 627
(1964).
93. For a similar implication, see R. BRAUCHER, DOCUMENTs OF TITLE 110 n.84, 111;
Bascom, Articles 7 and 9 of the Uniforr Commercial Code-Security Interests in the Ware-
houseman's Own Receipts Covering Fungibles, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 105, 135; cf., Note, 69
YALE L.J. 663, 703 (1960) (which poses the question).
94. "Under § 9-309 . . .Wagman would have prevailed if its warehouse receipt had
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Section 9-309 is a purchase provision. It follows a series of provi-
sions which insulate several categories of purchasers from the interest
of a prior perfected secured party.95 In particular it provides that
nothing in Article 9 "limits the rights of. . .a holder to whom a nego-
tiable document of title has been duly negotiated"; that is, that nothing
in Article 9 shall limit the rights of a qualified holder. The question
remains, however, whether section 9-309 applies against a party whose
rights arise before the document is issued. In both Hext and Boody,
the interest of the party claiming against the holder arose prior to
issuance of the document. In Boody the document was a nonnegoti-
able warehouse receipt, and the arbitrator correctly ruled that section
7-503 does not apply to such a receipt. 96 The Boody opinion goes on
to say, however, that had the receipt been negotiable, section 9-309
would have protected the qualified holder. The implication of this dic-
tum, that Article 7 does not control the rights of a qualified holder, and
the similar implication in Hext, in which the receipt was negotiable, is
troubling.
Article 9 is the fount of the secured party's rights. 97 If, therefore,
section 9-309 governs those situations where the interest of the secured
party arises before issuance of the document, then, strictly speaking,
such a secured party will always lose to the qualified holder. This re-
sult produces a direct conflict with the paramount rights rule of section
7-503. That provision expressly provides that the qualified holder will
not defeat the rights of a person who "had a perfected security interest"
in the goods before the issuance of the document. 98 Admittedly, those
paramount rights are subject to an estoppel exception; but the applica-
tion of that exception is not automatic, and a person free of the estop-
pel's preclusion may assert those paramount rights against the qualified
holder. In short, the Hext and Boody reading of section 9-309 sug-
gests that the qualified holder always defeats the secured party, while
section 7-503 clearly says that sometimes the prior secured party wins.
That conflict fades, however, if section 9-309 applies only to secur-
ity interests arising contemporaneously with or after issuance of the
document. Such a limitation of section 9-309 leaves the paramount
rights rule room to operate when the interest of the party claiming par-
been negotiable and the receipt had been 'duly negotiated' to Wagman." Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank v. Irving R. Boody Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560, 565 (Arb. Dec. 1963) (Funk, Arb.).
95. Sections 9-306, 9-307, 9-308 & 9-309 all contain provisions giving purchasers of
various types of collateral protection against perfected security interests in that collateral.
96. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
97. See U.C.C. §§ 9-101, 9-102, and comments thereto.
98. U.C.C. § 7-503(1).
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amount rights arises "before issuance of the document."99
Such a construction follows the traditional rule of statutory inter-
pretation. Courts construe sections of the same statute in a fashion
that renders them compatible. 1° ° In addition, and more convincingly,
the purpose of section 9-309 supports this approach. The Code autho-
rizes nonpossessory security interests in certain,types of collateral that
customarily move in commerce without title inquiry: instruments (ne-
gotiable instruments and securities), chattel paper, and negotiable doc-
uments of title.'01 These nonpossessory security rules accommodate
the vagaries of financing this type of collateral and protect lenders
against lien creditors. Such security interests, absent the rules of sec-
tions 9-308 and 9-309, would in themselves impose a severe restriction
on the commercial acceptability of such collateral. They would force
lenders and other purchasers to make time-consuming and costly title
inquiries.'0 2 Sections 9-308 and 9-309 remove that burden by protect-
ing buyers and creditors who take chattel paper, instruments, or negoti-
able documents in certain good-faith-purchase circumstances and who
do not inquire about filings or other nonpossessory security interests.10 3
The comments to both sections support this analysis.1o4 The purpose
of section 9-309, then, is to protect the qualified holder from nonposses-
sory security interests arising in the document under section 9-304(1).
To extend its rule to situations where the security interest has arisen in
the goods themselves prior to the issuance of a document covering the
goods would violate a fundamental rule of Code construction'05 by go-
99. U.C.C. § 7-503(1) (emphasis added).
100. School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 157 N.Y. 566, 52 N.E. 583 (1899).
101. Section 9-304(1) permits perfection of a nonpossessory security interest in chattel
paper or negotiable documents by filing in all instances. Subsections 9-304(4) and (5) per-
mit perfection of nonpossessory security interests in instruments or negotiable documents
without filing but in very narrow circumstances and for a period not exceeding 21 days in
each case.
102. "Under § 9-304 a security interest in instruments or in goods covered by documents
of title can be perfected, without possession or filing, for a 21-day period. This provision
reflects a policy decision that the utility of such short-term interests in these types of collat-
eral outweighs the 'secret lien' danger. If we accept the policy, it is a necessary corollary
that the first party to get such an interest has priority over later comers, unless the later
comers quaify as good faith purchasers under the rules applicable to negotiable and quasi-
negotiable collateral." 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 34.5,
at 912 (1965) (emphasis added).
103. Cf. U.C.C. § 7-602 (achieves similar protection for certain holders of warehouse
receipts against lien creditors).
104. See U.C.C. § 9-308, comments 2 and 4; U.C.C. § 9-309, comment 2.
105. "[T]he proper construction of the Act requires that its interpretation and applica-
tion be limited to its reason." U.C.C. § 1-102, comment 1.
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ing beyond the provision's intended limit.106
The reference in Hext and Boody to section 9-309, moreover, may
support a rule different from the strict view criticized here. In provid-
ing that "nothing" in Article 9 limits the rights of a qualified holder,
section 9-309 may mean to say that Article 7 governs those rights. Ar-
ticle 7 limits the rights of a qualified holder by the reference to a se-
cured party in section 7-503. This reading of section 9-309 would not
pose any conflict and is consistent with the view of this author that
Article 7 governs the rights of the qualified holder. Clearly, courts
should not infer from the Hext and Boody language any rule that the
qualified holder always defeats the secured party.
Hendries' Inc. v. American Express Co. 107 illustrates these issues in
a different context. In Hendries a bank issued a letter of credit and
took negotiable receipts to secure advances it made under the credit.
The facts of Hendries indicate that the bank was a qualified holder.
The bank's customer, which had used the credit to buy the goods cov-
ered by the receipts, entered into contracts of sale with buyers who paid
for the goods while they remained in the warehouse. The customer
failed to pay the bank and, therefore, could not deliver the goods. The
buyers sued the bank claiming that the good-faith-purchase rule of Ar-
ticle 9, section 9-307(1), protected them. That provision would give the
goods to a buyer in ordinary course free from the bank's security
interest.
The court rejected the argument. It held that the bank was a true
owner, not a secured party, and that therefore section 9-307(1) did not
apply. While the holding is consistent with the thesis advanced by this
Article, the reasoning is not. Although it is true that a qualified holder
takes title to the goods,10 8 Article 9 stipulates that its rules apply with-
out regard to location of title. Section 9-102 provides that the form of
the transaction does not matter. The critical fact is the existence of a
transaction intended to create a security interest, a fact clearly present
in the Hendries case.
Nonetheless, the buyers in Hendries should not be able to use sec-
tion 9-307(1). Section 9-309 forbids the use of Article 9 rules to defeat
106. The Boody opinion also suggests that § 9-309 does not affect the priority rule of §
9-312(5). Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Irving R. Boody, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560, 565 (Arb.
Dec. 1963) (Funk, Arb.). It is difficult to square that suggestion with the plain language of§
9-309, which permits "nothing" in Article 9, presumably § 9-312(5) included, to limit the
rights of a qualified holder. See also In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96,
105 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
107. 35 App. Div. 2d 412, 316 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1970).
108. U.C.C. § 7-502(1)(a)-(b).
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the rights of a qualified holder. 0 9 Article 7 is the proper source of those
rights; and only to the extent that it defers to Article 9, as in section 7-
503, does Article 9 play a role.
In brief, the courts have failed to utilize successfully the Code's
scheme for enhancing the marketing and financing of goods through
negotiable documents of title. That failure stems in large part from a
misunderstanding of the proper role of estoppel in the legal treatment
of qualified holders of such documents. A similar misunderstanding
plagues the line of cases considering the rights of the nonqualified
holder.
The Nonqualified Holder
By definition the qualified holder is one to whom a negotiable
document has been duly negotiated. That definition leaves two types
of nonqualified holder: persons who hold nonnegotiable documents
and persons holding negotiable documents to whom the document is
not duly negotiated. Section 7-504(1) defines the rights of both catego-
ries of nonqualified holders: "A transferee of a document, whether ne-
gotiable or nonnegotiable, to whom the document has been delivered
but not duly negotiated, acquires the title and rights which his trans-
feror had or had actual authority to convey." 110 If the transferor has
no title to the document and no actual authority to convey title to it,
the transferee gets nothing via the document whether the document is
negotiable or nonnegotiable.
This rule contrasts sharply with the rules in sections 7-502 and 7-
503, which go far in constructing a good-faith-purchase shield for the
qualified holder. In section 7-504 situations that shield disappears for
two reasons. First, the estoppel by deed implications of section 7-502
and Baldwin v. Childs"' do not benefit the nonqualified holder. Sec-
ond, section 7-503 does not apply in the nonqualified holder situa-
tion.1 2 Persons with rights paramount to those of the transferor always
defeat the nonqualified holder under section 7-504; the estoppel bene-
fits of section 7-503 do not extend to such a holder. Thus, for example,
if a true owner or a secured party entrusts goods to a bailor with actual
or apparent authority to store, and if that bailor stores the goods
109. Professor Skilton makes this point and discusses the Hendries case. Skilton, Buyer
in Ordinary Course of Business UnderArticle 9 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code (and Related
Matters), 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1, 49.
110. U.C.C. § 7-504(1).
111. 249 N.Y. 212, 163 N.E. 737 (1928). See note 20 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
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against negotiable or nonnegotiable receipts and transfers the receipts
to a nonqualified holder, the true owner or secured party will prevail if
the holder is relying solely on the receipt.
The language of section 7-504 goes far enough, moreover, to pre-
vent the nonqualified holder from asserting the principles of voidable
title. That doctrine sanctions defeat of the true owner's rights by a
good-faith purchaser who takes from one with voidable title." 3 Thus,
a true owner of goods who delivers them to a buyer while retaining the
right to reclaim them because of the buyer's fraud 1 4 nonetheless will
lose to a good faith purchaser under the doctrine. 1 5 Section 2-403(1),
the good-faith-purchase provision of Article 2, applies this rule to sales
of goods. Its first sentence, in words nearly identical to those of section
7-504, sets forth the umbrella rule for Article 2 that a purchaser takes
what his transferor had or had "power to transfer." Section 2-403,
however, goes on to adopt the voidable title doctrine by providing that
the purchaser of goods also acquires good title even fthe transferor had
voidable title."16 In contrast, the Code drafters chose to reject the
words "power to transfer" and not to incorporate any voidable title
reference in section 7-504. That choice indicates that the doctrine has
no place in commerce involving commodity paper.
The rule of section 7-504, then, is harsh and sometimes yields
anomalous results. For example, negotiable documents generally en-
joy a greater degree of negotiability than goods.'1 7 A nonqualified
holder holding a negotiable document of title, however, may have
fewer rights than would result from dealing with the goods themselves.
The good-faith-purchase rules of sections 9-307(1) and 2-403(2) apply
to buyers of goods. Such benefits accrue to the nonqualified holder
only if the holder attains the status of a buyer in ordinary course. Sim-
ilarly, a consignee of a nonnegotiable bill of lading may have greater
rights under section 7-504(1) than the nonqualified holder of a negotia-
ble bill of lading." 8 If the consignee's transferor had title or actual
authority to convey title, the consignee would receive good title. Yet,
the transferee of a negotiable document who cannot satisfy the require-
113. See Warren, supra note 2, at 475.
114. The right to reclaim is codified in the Code. U.C.C. § 2-702(2). Seegeneraly In re
Federal's Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977).
115. See, e.g., White v. Garden, 138 Eng. Rep. 364 (C.P. 1851).
116. U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
117. See Warren, supra note 2, at 484. Professor Warren suggests that the notion that
goods are negotiable is at a "more rudimentary stage of development." Id.
118. See U.C.C. § 7-504, comment 1.
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ments of section 9-307(1) or section 2-403(2) and whose transferor did
not have title or actual authority would not have good title.
A nonqualified holder can satisfy the Article 2 and Article 9 rules
only if such holder is a buyer in ordinary course, which perforce re-
quires establishing oneself in the role of buyer. Sometimes nonquali-
fled holders will be buyers. At times, however, they are only
purchasers. This distinction between buyers and purchasers parallels
the two roles documents of title serve: marketing and financing. The
concept of buyer in ordinary course is a marketing concept. 119 The
concept of purchase is broader and includes taking by mortgage,
pledge, or lien.120 A lender may rise to the status of a good-faith pur-
chaser121 but cannot rise to the level of a buyer in ordinary course,
because a lender does not buy out of inventory in the marketing sense
of the buyer-in-ordinary-course definition. Thus, it is the lender who is
most likely to fall victim to section 7-504. If the lender is not a quali-
fied holder, by definition, that lender will not benefit from the good-
faith-purchase rule of Article 7;122 similarly, the lender will be unable
to seek refuge in the buyer-in-ordinary-course rules of Articles 2 and 9.
The justification for this rather harsh treatment lies in the deference
Article 7 accords the concept of "due negotiation" and its willingness to
pay the price for protection of regular dealings with negotiable docu-
ments of title by refusing to accord any estoppel or voidable title bene-
fits to dealings which are irregular.12 3
In addition to voidable title and estoppel, waiver is a third com-
mon-law doctrine that may defeat rights of prior parties. Certainly
there is nothing in Article 7 to prevent a nonqualified holder from ar-
guing that a true owner or secured party expressly waived its rights to
assert an ownership or security interest against the nonqualified holder.
This waiver gives the transferor "actual authority" to convey the docu-
ment to the holder free of such interest. To hold, however, that any
conduct of the true owner or secured party constitutes implied waiver.
of those rights is an entirely different matter. As with other common-
law and equitable doctrines, the doctrine of implied waiver supple-
ments the Code "[u]nless displaced by [its] particular provisions." 124
119. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
120. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32).
121. See, e.g., Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238,1242 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
122. See U.C.C. § 7-503.
123. U.C.C. § 7-504, comment 1.
124. U.C.C. § 1-103. In determining the extent to which the Code displaces such older
principles, commercial lawyers must of course be mindful of the Code's rule calling for
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Implied waiver serves significant purposes in the Code. Both Arti-
cle 2125 and cases construing Article 9126 employ it to defeat rights of
true owners and of secured parties in certain instances. Section 1-205
suggests that courts can infer waiver from a course of dealing or trade
usage in any Code transaction, including one involving documents of
title.
The general rule governing the application of implied waiver, both
at common law and under the Code, contains an important limitation.
Only those parties dealing with the party from whose conduct waiver is
to be inferred may benefit from such waiver.127 In this respect implied
waiver resembles estoppel, and the clear policy of Article 7 against in-
voking estoppel to benefit nonqualified holders is the first argument
against permitting the use of implied waiver in a similar fashion. To
the extent that the nonqualified holder deals with the true owner or
secured party, that holder does not need the benefit of the implied-
waiver doctrine. In such cases the transferor will have conveyed to the
nonqualified holder all of the ownership or security interest. It is only
in third party situations that these conveyancing rules become impor-
tant, and in those situations a nonqualified holder would not be dealing
with the true owner or secured party and implied waiver is, therefore,
inapplicable.
Some courts use an expansive interpretation of section 9-306(2) to
fashion an exception to the general rule. 128 That section provides that
waiver of the condition against disposition of the collateral constitutes
waiver of the security interest in the collateral. The cases finding im-
plied waiver permit buyers who have never dealt with the secured party
to benefit from the secured party's conduct which has reasonably led
not the buyer but the buyer's transferor to believe that the sale is au-
liberal construction of all provisions to promote the Code's purposes and policies, a rule
limited only by the reason of these various provisions. See U.C.C. § 1-102(1) and comment
1.
125. See U.C.C. §§ 2-208(3), 2-209(5). See also U.C.C. § 2-208, comment 3.
126. See, e.g., McFadden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 260 Md. 601, 273
A.2d 198 (1971).
127. Weidinger Chevrolet, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 501 F.2d 459, 463 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974). Code provisions recognizing implied waiver doc-
trine assume that the party invoking the doctrine dealt with the party against whom it ap-
plied. See U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-208, 2-209.
128. For a more thorough discussion of the cases construing this provision, see Dolan,
Section 9-307(1).: The UCC's Obstacle to Agricultural Commerce in the Open Market, 72 Nw.
U.L. REV. 706, 725-35 (1977).
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thorized.129 This exception arises, however, only because the statute
leaves room for it,13o and the statute only operates against secured
parties.131
In short, the nonqualified holder finds narrow support in the sup-
plemental rules of the common law or in the Code itself for the position
that such holder should take anything more than that which section 7-
504 provides: the interest which the transferor had or had actual au-
thority to convey. Thus, the substantial difference in treatment ac-
corded by the Code to qualified and nonqualified holders should be
apparent. Yet cases dealing with nonqualified holders often stumble
over these distinctions.
In Cleveland v. McNabb,132 for example, the court found that the
Commodity Credit Corporation took the warehouse receipts with no-
tice of defenses and therefore did not rise to the status of a qualified
holder. Although the court's finding may be subject to criticism, all
estoppel inquiry must necessarily end when the court determined that
the party was not a qualified holder. As a lender rather than a buyer,
the corporation could not benefit from the estoppel rules of Articles 2
or 9; nor should it have been able to benefit from the estoppel rule of
Article 7 because that rule applies only to qualified holders.1 33 None-
theless, when the Commodity Credit Corporation raised an estoppel
argument, admittedly in the context of common-law estoppel rather
than as an adjunct to its claim of the rights of a qualified holder, the
Cleveland court ignored these distinctions. Instead, the court evalu-
ated and rejected the argument, not because the corporation was a non-
qualified holder nor because it was not a buyer in ordinary course, but
on the grounds that the Tennessee crop-lien statute did not contemplate
an estoppel exception.
Since the corporation could not enjoy estoppel rights by virtue of
its position as a nonqualified holder, 34 its estoppel argument must pre-
suppose that it enjoyed rights as a purchaser of the goods. Such a pre-
129. See, e.g., Farmers Nat'1 Bank v. Ceres Land Co., 32 Colo. App. 290, 512 P.2d 1174
(1973); Draper v. Minneapolis-Moline, Inc., 100 I. App. 2d 324, 241 N.E.2d 342 (1968).
130. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
131. The section applies only to a "security interest." U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
132. 312 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Tenn. 1970). For a discussion of the facts of this case, see
text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 111 & 112 supra.
134. It is not clear from the opinion what arguments the corporation raised. A code-
fendant apparently argued estoppel and good faith purchase. The opinion recites that the
corporation also raised the estoppel issue, but does not make the basis of the corporation's
position clear. Significantly, however, the court treats the estoppel issue quite apart from
the corporation's rights as a nonqualified holder. It is that separation of the discussion
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sumption runs directly counter to the Code's carefully drawn
distinction between qualified and nonqualified holders. It is the quali-
fied holder who receives an interest in the goods by virtue of the trans-
action 135 and who benefits from good-faith-purchase estoppel rules
referred to in the qualified-holder section. 136 The nonqualified holder
obtains only what the transferor had or had actual authority to con-
vey. 13 7 The corporation's argument, therefore, positioned the cart
before the horse by assuming that its rights in the goods gave it the
power to invoke estoppel. Under section 7-504 the corporation had
rights in the goods only if its transferor had such rights or had actual
authority to convey such rights. The corporation, being neither a
buyer nor a qualified holder, cannot benefit from estoppel.
In Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Gill,'38 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, in an opinion withdrawn two years later, went further
than the Cleveland court and actually invoked estoppel to aid a lender
which was a nonqualified holder. The lending bank held sixteen nego-
tiable warehouse receipts issued by an elevator to the bank's debtor
which were then pledged by that debtor to secure loan advances made
by the bank. One Woodcock was both local manager of the elevator
and secretary-treasurer of the borrower. As part of a scheme to cover
elevator shortages, he caused thirteen new receipts to be issued to the
borrower and delivered them to the bank which, upon receiving them,
surrendered the original sixteen receipts. The bank's note teller did
not realize until after Woodcock left the bank that the borrower had
not endorsed the thirteen new receipts. Consequently, the court prop-
erly held that the bank was not a qualified holder. Even though the
receipts were negotiable, they had not been duly negotiated to the
bank. 139 Accordingly, the court observed, "the Bank has no greater
right by virtue of these receipts than did [the borrower]."' 140
Notwithstanding that conclusion, the court went on to hold that
because the benefit from the fraud accrued to the elevator, rather than
the borrower, the elevator "cannot now be heard to deny [the] validity"
which suggests that the court was willing to accord the corporation rights independent of its
status as a nonqualified holder.
135. "[A] holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated ac-
quires thereby . . . title to the goods .... " U.C.C. § 7-502(1).
136. See notes 29-42 and accompanying text supra.
137. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
138. 286 N.C. 342, 211 S.E.2d 327 (1975), rev'd on rehearing, 293 N.C. 164, 237 S.E.2d
21 (1977).
139. See U.C.C. § 7-501(1).
140. 286 N.C. 342, 357, 211 S.E.2d 327, 338 (1975).
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of the receipts.14 1 Thus, the court estopped the elevator. The court
saw the bank as the less culpable party and sought to impose liability
upon Woodcock, the surety on his bond, and the elevator.' 42 Liability,
however, would have attached under section 7-203.143 It was unneces-
sary for the court to rely on the estoppel ruling to gain the equitable
result. 44  In fact, more than two years after deciding the Branch
Banking case the Supreme Court of North Carolina "withdrew" its
opinion and rendered a decision which holds that section 7-203 and not
section 7-504 governs the result.145 Significantly, the court did not cor-
rect the misimpressions of its earlier opinion, even though it is clear
that counsel had argued the point on rehearing. 46 The court thereby
let stand the same error made by the Cleveland court: application of
estoppel or similar rules for the benefit of a nonqualified holder to
whom the Code explicitly denies such relief.
In Lofton v. Mooney' 47 the Supreme Court of Kentucky pursued a
similar course of disregarding the distinction between the qualified and
nonqualified holder. In Lofton, farmers delivered their grain to a mill,
with part to be stored and part to be purchased under contract with the
141. Id. at 360, 211 S.E.2d at 339.
142. In his dissent to the North Carolina Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in the
Branch Banking case, one justice disputes the conclusion that the holding amounts to an
estoppel. On rehearing, counsel for the defendants argued, as this Article does, that § 7-504
denies estoppel benefits to the nonqualified holder. The dissenter rejected the contention,
arguing that the court's earlier decision amounted to an application not of the equitable
doctrine of estoppel but of the common law doctrine of ratification. That distinction, how-
ever, begs the question, which is whether the court gave the nonqualified holder, who claims
rights to goods under an instrument, greater rights than his tranferor had or had actual
authority to convey. The court's holding gave the bank greater rights than its transferor
had. It matters not whether the court bottoms its holding on estoppel, voidable title, im-
plied waiver or ratification. See text accompanying notes 111-30 supra.
143. "A. . . purchaser for value in good faith of a document of title other than a bill of
lading relying. . . upon the description therein of the goods may recover from the issuer
damages caused by the non-receipt. . . of the goods. . . ." U.C.C. § 7-203. A nonquali-
fled holder may qualify as a purchaser for value in good faith. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(32), 1-
201(33). The lack of an indorsement would not defeat the bank's claim under § 7-203. In
fact the borrower later supplied the indorsement but at a time when the bank knew of the
defense. That notice would not alter the bank's right to sue the elevator under § 7-203 for
nondelivery. See Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing
Corp., 16 N.Y.2d 344,213 N.E.2d 873, 266 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1965) (warehouse liable for failure
to deliver commodity it actually received).
144. Significantly, § 7-203 does not excuse the liability of the elevator where, as in
Branch Banking, the agent issues the receipt without authorization from his warehouse prin-
cipal. See U.C.C. § 7-203, comment.
145. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Gill, 293 N.C. 164, 237 S.E.2d 21 (1977).
146. 237 S.E.2d at 38 (dissent).
147. 452 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1970).
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mill. Both the pleadings and the fact situation were confusing, 148 but it
appears that a double bailment was involved.
The mill, needing financing, entered into a field-warehouse ar-
rangement whereby it rebailed the grain with the field warehouse
which issued a nonnegotiable receipt directly to the mill's bank. Ap-
parently, the grain subject to the field-warehouse receipt included both
grain delivered for storage and grain delivered pursuant to the
purchase contracts with the mill. The farmers sued the mill for sums
due on the purchase contracts, obtained a judgment, and levied on the
grain in the field warehouse. The bank claimed superior rights. The
farmers, in turn, sued the bank for sums paid to it, purportedly out of
proceeds from earlier sales of their grain other than that subject to the
attachment levy.
The court regards the case, at its simplest level, as a dispute be-
tween a lien creditor and a secured party. Assuming that there was an
underlying security agreement between the bank and the debtor, the
bank perfected its security interest by having the nonnegotiable re-
ceipts issued in its name.149 That perfection, it appears from the facts
of the case, antedated attachment by the farmers, and the perfected,
secured party, therefore, prevailed under general Code rules. 50 The
pleadings of the Lofton case may well justify that result, but it is clear
from the arguments raised by counsel and considered by the court that
the farmers attempted to assert paramount rights and thereby to over-
come the general priority rule that a perfected secured party will defeat
a lien creditor.
First the bank argued that section 7-503 applied and that the es-
toppel rule of that section defeated the farmers. The court agreed that
the farmers had delivered the grain to the mill which had "apparent, if
not actual, authority to sell it;' 15' but the court noted that the farmers
were not asserting prior, paramount rights. The farmers claimed rights
under their attachment, which arose after issuance of the receipt.
148. "As the chancellor observed in an understatement, the pleadings in this case are
'rather confusing.'" Id. at 618.
149. U.C.C. § 9-304(3).
150. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301(l)(b).
151. Lofton v. Mooney, 452 S.W.2d 617,619 (Ky. 1970). The court's choice of language
reveals its error. Indeed, the entrustment by the farmer to the elevator did give authority to
sell; and had the elevator sold by negotiable receipt, nonnegotiable receipt, or delivery of
the grain, a buyer in ordinary course or qualified holder would defeat the farmer. See
U.C.C. §§ 7-205, 7-503, 9-307(1). Though the bank is a purchaser, it is neither a buyer nor a
qualified holder (U.C.C. § 1-201(32)-(33)). The elevator did not sell grain, but rather,
pledged it. The court is engaging in the same circular reasoning which characterized the
Branch Banking opinion. See text accompanying notes 138-44 supra.
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Clearly the farmers did enjoy prior, paramount rights in that por-
tion of the grain they delivered for storage. The bank, moreover, was
not entitled to use the estoppel rule of section 7-503 as to that corn.
The bank was not a qualified holder. It held a nonnegotiable receipt.
Section 7-504 should have governed the rights of the bank. The
plaintiff farmers in the Lofton case argued that the bank's rights under
that provision were subordinate to those of the true owners. The court,
however, refused to apply section 7-504, reasoning that the section ap-
plies only to "transferees." The bank was not a transferee but an is-
suee. The warehouse issued the receipts directly to the bank. Thus,
the court found that neither of the transfer provisions of Article 7 ap-
plied to the bank: section 7-502 was inapplicable because of estoppel152
and section 7-504 was inapplicable because the bank was an issuee.
Consequently, the court found itself with no authority in Article 7 to
determine the rights of the bank. To resolve its dilemma it concluded,
without citing any authority, that the bank "stands in the shoes of a
good faith purchaser for value."153
That resolution exposes the court's basic misunderstanding of the
doctrine of good faith purchase in documentary transactions. Since
this bank held nonnegotiable receipts and was not a buyer, its rights
must arise under Article 7. First, section 7-502 and section 7-504 make
it clear that of all persons who claim rights under documents of title,
only the qualified holder may use estoppel. Second, Article 7 classifies
persons claiming rights under documents of title into only two classes:
those who are qualified holders and those who are not. Section 7-502
governs the rights of the first class and section 7-504 governs the rights
of the second. The Lofton court creates a third class, those whose
rights are governed by some obscure pre- or non-Code notion. By ex-
cluding an issuee from the class of transferees, the court creates a gap
in the coverage of Article 7 contrary to the rule requiring liberal con-
struction of Code provisions.1 54
There are two ways in which field-warehouse financing can pro-
ceed. Either the field warehouse can issue the receipts to its bailor (in
152. In fact, it did not apply because the receipts were nonnegotiable.
153. Lofton v. Mooney, 452 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Ky. 1970).
154. See U.C.C. § 1-102. In this regard Professor Gilmore takes a strong position. He
argues that it would be "absurd" to suggest that the result turn on the fact of whether the
field warehouse issues the receipt to the bailor who, in turn, "transfers" to the bank or
whether the field warehouse issues the receipt directly to the bank. 1 G. GILMoRE, SECUR-
rry INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 6.6, at 173 n.6 (1965); cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(20)
(Code defines "holder" to include an issuee); U.C.C. § 7-203 (extending protection against a
bailee's nonreceipt or misdescription to issuees as well as transferees).
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Lofton, the mill) and the bailor can transfer them to the bank, or the
warehouse can issue the receipts directly to the bank. The form of the
transaction should not matter. In either event, section 7-504 should
govern, and the rights of the bank should be measured by the rights of
the bailor. In Lofton, then, the bank could receive only those interests
the mill had in the grain or had actual authority to convey. The mill
had no rights in the grain stored and no actual authority to grant the
bank a security interest in it. The bank, therefore, took no interest in
that grain. With respect to the grain the farmers had sold to the eleva-
tor, however, the bank took free of the true owners' interest. 155
Although other decisions demonstrate a greater degree of adher-
ence to the distinction between qualified and nonqualified holders, the
decisions themselves are not entirely helpful. The court's conclusion
seems almost accidental in one of them and in the second the course of
the decision raises troubling questions.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. SLT Warehouse Co. 156 reflects a
more loyal disposition toward the distinctions of Article 7 between ne-
gotiable and nonnegotiable receipts. The facts of Citizens Bank parallel
those of Lofton. The farmers "entrusted" 1 57 their grain to an elevator,
which in turn entered into a field-warehousing arrangement with the
defendant. The defendant field warehouse issued nonnegotiable re-
ceipts to the elevator rather than directly to the bank, and the elevator
transferred them to the plaintiff bank. The court ruled first, that the
bank could not defeat the rights of the farmers, and second, that deliv-
ery of the grain to the farmers would have absolved the field warehouse
from liability.1 58
Article 7 supports both rulings. First, although the court did not
directly refer to it, the entrustment of the grain by the farmers did not
benefit the bank. While the entrustment might have precluded the
farmers from asserting their paramount rights against a qualified
holder under section 7-503(l)(a) or (b), it did not affect the farmers'
rights against the bank, which held nonnegotiable receipts and there-
fore was a nonqualified holder. Second, section 7-403 explicitly ab-
solves from liability a warehouse that delivers commodities to one
155. See U.C.C. § 2-702(3). The better reasoned cases support this position. See
Stowers v. Mahon (in re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 834 (1976).
156. 368 F. Supp. 1042 (M.D. Ga. 1974), affdpercuriam, 515 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1975).
157. Id. at 1043.
158. In fact, the elevator had surreptitiously returned the grain without the knowledge of
the field warehouse or the bank. Id. at 1044-45.
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whose rights are superior to those of the party holding the receipt. In
this case the farmers enjoyed such superior rights; therefore, delivery to
them should have left the bank (a nonqualified holder) with no rights
against the warehouse.
There is no discussion of estoppel in the Citizens Bank opinion,
and it may be that the litigants did not raise the issue. The case then
does not serve as authority for the distinctions this paper posits, but
rather as an illustration of them. Had the receipts to the Citizens Bank
been negotiable and the bank a qualified holder, an estoppel inquiry
would have governed the outcome. If the farmers had "entrusted" in a
fashion that precluded them from asserting their paramount rights
against the bank, delivery to the farmers would have been wrongful.1 59
In Midland Bean Co. v. Farmers State Bank,160 a court seemingly
understood these distinctions and ruled in favor of the true owners and
against the nonqualified holder. In other respects, however, the
Midland opinion raises questions. The plaintiff in that case purchased
beans by drawing nonnegotiable "drafts" on the elevator. The eleva-
tor, in turn, accepted those "drafts."' 6 ' The court held that the ac-
cepted drafts were documents of title and that section 7-504 governed
the rights of the purchaser because the drafts were nonnegotiable. To
this extent the court's opinion finds support in Article 7. Such drafts
are in the nature of delivery orders 62 and their acceptance by the ware-
house renders them "for practical purposes indistinguishable from a
warehouse receipt."'' 63
The first troubling feature of the Midland holding arises out of the
timing. The opinion recites that the elevator accepted the drafts over a
period extending from September, 1971 to May, 1972. On January 4,
1972 the elevator acquired beans by taking a warehouse receipt from
one Lundock.' 64 Although the opinion does not disclose whether this
159. Accord, U.C.C. § 7-403, comment 2.
160. 552 P.2d 317 (Colo. App. 1976).
161. The opinion indicates that the elevator "endorsed" the draft. Id. at 319. Presuma-
bly it endorsed the check which accompanied the drafts and "accepted" the drafts. It could
then fill the orders from time to time pursuant to the delivery dates in the drafts.
162. "'Delivery order' means a written order to deliver goods directed to a warehouse-
man. . . " U.C.C. § 7-102(l)(d) (emphasis added).
163. U.C.C. § 7-102, comment 3.
164. The opinion follows the disconcerting practice of referring to these transactions and
documents in terms of the underlying commodity. It says that plaintiff "bought" beans
from the elevator and that the elevator "purchased" beans from Lundock. Midland Bean
Co. v. Farmers State Bank, 552 P.2d 317, 319, 321 (Colo. App. 1976). Whether, in fact,
plaintiff "bought" anything other than a nonnegotiable document of title and whether the
elevator "purchased" anything other than a warehouse receipt, depends on facts not recited
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receipt, issued by a grain company, was negotiable or nonnegotiable,
the court concluded that the elevator had title to the Lundock beans.
"[I]t follows that Brush Elevator could convey full rights in the
'Lundock' beans to [plaintiff]. 165 In fact, that conclusion follows only
if the nonnegotiable drafts upon which the plaintiff relied were ac-
cepted after the elevator acquired an interest in the Lundock beans, a
fact the court nowhere recites. If it had been true that the elevator
possessed no beans to "fill" the drafts when it accepted them, the
Midland holding would then permit the subsequent purchase by the
elevator to "feed" the earlier drafts. Such a holding amounts quite
simply to an application of the Baldwin v. Childs rule of estoppel by
deed. That estoppel rule should apply only in favor of a negotiable
document of title. 166 Midland, then, is the most recent case supporting
what is fast becoming a majority rule, 167 which largely ignores or mis-
understands the basic disparity between qualified and nonqualified
holders and which fails to recognize that the application of estoppel
principles is proper in regard to the former and not to the latter.
The Interplay of Articles 7 and 9 with Respect to Nonqualified Holders
The second problem with the Midland decision relates to the inter-
action of Articles 7 and 9. After concluding that Midland, the buyer,
acquired an interest in the Lundock beans, the Midland court then had
to resolve a dispute between Midland and the elevator's bank which
had obtained a security interest in all of the elevator's assets. As in
Branch Banking, the court issued an opinion and subsequently with-
drew it. In its original opinion, 168 the court concluded that the bank
was unperfected as to the Lundock beans and, therefore, the plaintiff
prevailed since it had "title" to the beans when it took the nonnegoti-
in the opinion. The Midland opinion, in the fashion of both the Branch Banking and
Lofton cases, mistakenly characterizes the transaction as a sale or purchase of commodities
before such a characterization can be made safely.
165. Id. at 322.
166. See U.C.C. § 7-502(l)(c) and comment 2. See text accompanying notes 111-18
supra.
167. In fact, none of the cases which consider these estoppel rules makes the distinction
the drafters of Article 7 took such pains to define, though there are cases which recognize
that § 7-503 does not apply to nonnegotiable documents. See Citizens Bank and Trust Co.
v. SLT Warehouse Co., 368 F. Supp. 1042, 1048 (M.D. Ga. 1974), affdpercuriam, 515 F.2d
1382 (5th Cir. 1975); Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair Endsley Co., 10 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 176, 190 (W.D. Mich. 1971); Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Irving R. Boody Co., 1
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560, 568-69 (Arb. Dec. 1963) (Funk, Arb.).
168. Midland Bean Co. v. Farmers State Bank, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 171 (Colo. App.
1976).
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able "drafts" from the elevator. 169 Yet it is not necessary under either
Article 7 or Article 9 for a secured party to perfect in order to defeat
Midland.170 Under section 9-301(l)(c), by implication, a buyer of
goods or documents loses to an unperfected secured party 71 unless the
buyer is either a buyer in ordinary course 72 or has received delivery 73
of the collateral.174 The court did not find that plaintiff was a buyer in
ordinary course, although this might well have been the case. Yet
without that finding, there is nothing left on which the court can base
its'ruling for the plaintiff, since plaintiff had not received delivery of
the beans. 175 In short, section 7-504 should govern, because the only
rights the plaintiff acquired under the nonnegotiable "drafts" were
rights which its transferor had or had actual authority to convey.
Here, the interest of the transferor (the elevator) taken by the plaintiff
is an interest subject to the security interest of the bank.176 In sum, the
Midland court's original opinion fashioned a rule which complies with
neither Article 7 nor 9, both of which consistently call for a decision
against the plaintiff unless it establishes itself as a buyer in ordinary
course.
When the Midland court originally concluded that the bank was
169. Id. at 177.
170. Clearly, the bank would defeat Midland if the bank were a perfected secured party
and Midland were not. See U.C.C. §§ 7-504(1), 9-201. Midland is not a secured party,
since the elevator did not sign a written security agreement granting Midland a security
interest in the Lundock beans. The mere issuance of a nonnegotiable receipt in the name of
Midland is not enough to create a security interest. See note 181 infra.
171. The opinion does not explain its conclusion that the bank was unperfected. If the
receipt covering the Lundock Beans was a negotiable receipt, the bank may well have been
perfected. Section 9-304(1) provides that a security interest in a negotiable document of title
may be perfected by filing, and the bank had filed. Similarly, if the receipt were nonnegoti-
able, § 9-304(3) provides that a security interest in the goods may be perfected by filing as to
the goods themselves or by notification to the bailee. The key to perfected status, then, is
the description of the collateral in the security agreement and the filed financing statement.
If those descriptions had been sufficient to cover all assets of the elevator, including negotia-
ble documents of title and beans covered by nonnegotiable documents of title, or if the
bailee grain company had been notified, the bank would have been perfected.
172. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (buyer in ordinary course defeats security interest created by
the seller).
173. Cf. U.C.C. § 7-205 (buyer in ordinary course of fungible goods from warehouse
defeats person claiming under warehouse receipt if the goods have been delivered).
174. The Code's use of the term "collateral" makes it clear that it is delivery of the beans
and not the document which is the critical delivery. The bank's collateral consisted of
beans, not the accepted "drafts" of which the bank had no knowledge.
175. Indeed, the plaintiff's seller had not received delivery of the beans, which, presuma-
bly, were still in the elevator that had issued the receipt to Lundock. The plaintiffs seller
had received only a receipt covering the Lundock beans.
176. See U.C.C. § 9-201.
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unperfected, 177 it appears to have assumed that the parties' rights
should be measured sometime after the elevator defaulted. In fact, the
elevator signed the draft upon which the plaintiff based its claim be-
tween September 4, 1971 and May 4, 1972. The bank took its security
interest on May 10, 1972. The court's modifled opinion reasoned that
at the time the elevator accepted the draft and thereby transferred its
interest in the beans to plaintiff, the bank had no security interest at all.
In that event, under section 7-504, the plaintiff took what its transferor
had at the time of transfer, beans free from the security interest.
Nothing in Article 9 disturbs that result. The difficulty with the
second opinion lies in the fact, alluded to above, that the court does not
make it clear whether the elevator had any interest in the Lundock
beans when it accepted the draft. The court, therefore, leaves itself
open to the criticism that it was invoking the Baldwin v. Childs estoppel
by deed rule improperly, that is, in favor of a nonqualified holder.
Thus, the modified opinion fails to correct the misimpression, created
by the original decision, that the buyer of a nonnegotiable document of
title takes priority over an unperfected secured party.
The nettlesome question of whether Article 7 or 9 is the source of a
nonqualified holder's rights in disputes with a secured party has been
raised by two additional cases. In Philadelohia National Bank v. Irving
R. Boody Co. ,178 the arbitrator took the position that those rights ema-
nate from Article 9 and concluded that Articles 9 and 7 would yield the
same results in any event. 179 Boody, a secured party, asserted that its
security interest should prevail, under the terms of section 9-312(5)(b),
over the rights of Wagman, a nonqualified holder who also claimed a
security interest. 180 Both Boody and the nonqualified holder had ex-
tended credit' 8 1 to the debtor with the expectation of obtaining a secur-
177. Midland Bean Co. v. Farmers State Bank, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 171, 177 (Colo.
App. 1976).
178. 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560 (Arb. Dec. 1963) (Funk, Arb.)
179. Id. at 565-66.
180. The Boody case arose prior to the 1972 modifications of § 9-312(5), but the result
would not be affected by the amendments. Compare U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1962 version) with
U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972 version).
181. The opinion recites that the nonqualified holder obtained its rights by "pledge" of
the nonnegotiable receipt. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Irving R. Boody Co., I U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 560, 564 (Arb. Dec. 1963) (Funk, Arb.). In fact the parties by stipulation had framed
the issue in terms of the rights of a "bona fide pledgee." Id. at 563. Some authorities
question the notion that a nonnegotiable receipt can be the subject of a pledge. See R.
SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND CON-
SUMER LAW 204-05 (2d ed. 1974). That objection, which the cited authors carry over to
negotiable documents of title as well, is theoretical in origin. It posits the idea that since the
lender does not have possession of the goods, the transfer which effects the security interest
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ity interest in certain wool. After granting a security interest to Boody,
the debtor bailed the wool and caused a nonnegotiable receipt to be
issued to Wagman. Under the rules of Article 9 both parties, then,
could claim the status of a perfected secured party. Boody's security
interest arose out of a written security agreement' 82 and filed financing
statement. Presumably, Wagman also had a written security agree-
ment and had perfected his security interest pursuant to section 9-
304(3) by having the nonnegotiable receipt issued in his name. The
arbitrator concluded that the priority rules of Article 9 controlled,
1 83
does not meet the sine qua non of a classic pledge. In the classic pledge it is the deprivation
by the secured party of possession by the debtor which prevents the debtor from creating
interests in others, be they buyers or creditors. Id. These observations are not academic
fancy. They highlight, especially in the nonnegotiable receipt situation, the fact that the
rights of the so-called pledgee of a document of title derive not from possession of the goods
but from rights in the document. Rights under a document of title, however, depend on the
rules of Article 7, not the pledge rules of Article 9 or pre-Code common law. Under the
rules of Article 9, furthermore, it is risky to speak of "pledging" a nonnegotiable document
of title. Article 9 permits the pledgee to rely on its possession pursuant to an oral agreement
as a method of creating his security interest. U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(a). If the "pledgee" does
not possess the collateral, however, the pledgee must obtain a written security agreement.
Id. The provisions of § 9-304(3) which relate to perfection of a security interest in goods
covered by a nonnegotiable document do not obviate the necessity of a written security
agreement absent possession of the goods. In fact, they do not even suggest that possession
of a nonnegotiable document can serve to perfect the security interest, let alone create it.
Professor Gilmore suggests, however, that in the realm of field warehousing, "there is no
reason why delivery of the [nonnegotiable] receipts by warehouseman to lender should not
constitute a good pledge." 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §
1.4, at 20 (1965). He would accord similar treatment to nonnegotiable receipts covering
distilled spirits and issued pursuant to federal statute. Id.
These suggestions by Professor Gilmore may well be the Code rule. The Code sanc-
tions possession by an agent. Sections 9-304(3) and 7-504(2)(b) recognize that the identity of
the bailee's principal may change without delivery of the goods themselves. Thus, for ex-
ample, if a bailor transfers his interest in the goods by a nonnegotiable document t6 a trans-
feree and not/ies the bailee of the transfer, the Code deems the transferee to have possession
of the goods. § 9-304(3). The bailee has become the agent of and holds the goods for the
transferee. It makes sense to extend that concept of possession by an agent not only to
purposes of the perfection requirement of § 9-304(3) but also to purposes of the pledge rule
of § 9-203. See note 182 infra.
182. The arbitrator's opinion recites: "Wagman obtained a perfected security interest by
the pledge to it of a nonnegotiable warehouse receipt for the wool, issued in its name."
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Irving R. Boody & Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560, 564 (Arb. Dec.
1963) (Funk, Arb.). The stipulation of fact in Boody supports that conclusion. Id. at 562-
63. If Wagman did not have a written security agreement he would still be a secured party.
See note 181 supra. The issuance of the nonnegotiable receipt to Wagman presupposes
notice to the bailee. Wagman's position, then, is superior to that of Midland in the Midiand
Bean Co. case. See notes 160-177 supra. Midland, not being a secured party, is subject to
the negative implication rule of§ 9-301(l)(c) and thus loses to an unperfected secured party.
Wagman, by virtue of his secured status, escapes this fate. See note 171 supra.
183. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Irving R. Boody & Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 560, 565
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and held that section 9-312, the provision which governs disputes be-
tween perfected secured parties, dictated a result for Boody.' 84
Analysis of this dispute under Article 7 reveals the same result.
Wagman, as a nonqualified holder, obtains only those rights which his
transferor, the debtor, had in the wool or had actual authority to con-
vey.' 85 The debtor's rights in the wool were subject to Boody's security
interest. Wagman, therefore, took subject to that interest. The arbitra-
tor, however, rested his decision entirely upon Article 9; he was not
faced with any potential conflict with Article 7, having correctly con-
cluded that Articles 7 and 9 were compatible under these facts. In a
subsequent decision 86 a federal district court followed Boody, holding
that Article 9 alone governs priority disputes between two parties
claiming a security interest.
The difficulty with the general view expressed in the Boody case
lies in the fact that Article 7 and section 9-312 do not always yield the
same result. The priority rules shift in one direction when the trans-
feree of a nonnegotiable receipt is a buyer, and in another when the
transferee is a lender. Under the rules of section 9-312(5), as amended
in 1972, if Boody had filed its financing statement prior to the time the
debtor signed a security agreement granting Boody a security interest
in the wool and if Wagman had meanwhile acquired the receipts,
thereby perfecting his security interest before Boody's security interest
attached, 18 7 section 9-312 would effect one result and Article 7 another.
Under section 9-312(5)(a), Boody, having filed before Wagman per-
fected, would have priority. Under Article 7, however, Wagman, be-
ing the transferee of a nonnegotiable receipt, would take what the
debtor, his transferor, had, namely title to the wool unencumbered by
Boody's security interest, which had not yet attached. 88 Concededly,
this conflict arises in a narrow situation, and under facts different from
(Arb. Dec. 1963) (Funk, Arb.). The arbitrator also concluded that Article 7 would yield the
same result. Id. at 566.
184. Under U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(b) (1962 version) if there are two perfected secured par-
ties, unless they both perfect by filing, the first to perfect has priority.
185. U.C.C. § 7-504.
186. Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Esslair Endsley Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
176, 190 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
187. Under the assumed facts, Boody's security interest could not attach until Boody
had given value, the debtor had an interest in the collateral and the security agreement was
signed. U.C.C. § 9-203.
188. Under this hypothetical the security interest would not attach until Boody has given
value and obtained the debtor's signature on a written security agreement describing the
collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-203(2).
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those of Boody; it nonetheless, supports the view that Article 7 and
Article 9 do not always provide the same answer.
The illustration, moreover, suggests an alternative approach for
resolving any potential conflict between the two articles. Given the
hypothetical modification of the Boody facts, i.e., that Wagman takes
the nonnegotiable receipt after the time Boody filed but before Boody's
security interest attaches, assume additionally that Wagman is not a
lender but a buyer of the wool. He buys not by taking delivery of the
wool, but rather by having the owner deliver a nonnegotiable receipt.
Article 9 fashions protection for purchasers of goods in a number
of provisions: sections 9-301(l)(c); 9-306(2); and 9-307(1). The first
protects those buyers who are not buyers in the ordinary course against
unperfected secured parties; the second protects buyers when the se-
cured party authorizes the sale; the third protects buyers in ordinary
course. The second and third provisions clearly do not protect Wag-
man, because the hypothetical posits neither authority for the secured
party to sell nor buyer in ordinary course status for Wagman. 189 Sec-
tion 9-301(l)(c) is the only other provision which might apply, yet
Wagman also fails to qualify for its shelter. First, the section purports
to protect buyers against a secured party. In the hypothetical, Boody
does not become a secured party until after Wagman takes the receipt.
If, however, Wagman could defeat a secured party, he should be able
to defeat an unsecured party. Given that reasonable implication in
section 9-301(l)(c), Wagman still fails to come within its terms, which
apply only if he has taken delivery of the "collateral." 190 Boody's col-
189. A recent New York decision holds that such a buyer may qualify for buyer in
ordinary course status and that the fact that the goods are not delivered poses no obstacle to
that determination. See Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632,
350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976).
190. Clearly, the nonnegotiable document received by Wagman cannot satisfy the deliv-
ery requirement of the section. Delivery of a nonnegotiable receipt does not operate as
delivery of the goods. Compare U.C.C. §§ 7-502(1), 9-304(1) & (2) with U.C.C. §§ 7-504, 9-
304(3). This conclusion appears at first blush to conflict with comment 4 to § 9-301. That
comment suggests that delivery of a document of title is sufficient delivery. Significantly,
however, both the comment and the section refer to delivery of "collateral." A nonnegoti-
able document is not "collateral" for the reasons set forth in note 181 supra. Only negotia-
ble documents of title can serve as "collateral." In addition, the term "collateral" must refer
to the property in which the unperfected secured party claims a security interest. In the
Boody case, Boody claimed no security interest in the document of title held by Wagman.
Boody claimed a security interest in the wool, and if Boody had been unperfected, as the
hypothetical assumes, only delivery of the wool (Boody's collateral) would defeat Boody
under the terms of § 9-301(1)(c). Similarly, a buyer in ordinary course may defeat a trans-
feree but he must notify the bailee or be able to say that he has taken delivery of the goods.
U.C.C. § 7-504(2)(b).
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lateral consists of the wool, and Wagman did not take delivery of the
wool. Article 9, then, yields nothing to protect this hypothetical
Wagman.
Section 9-201, however, does not limit protection of purchasers to
Article 9. It extends the effect of the security agreement to purchasers
except "as otherwise provided by this Act."'19 The Act provides other-
wise in section 7-504, stipulating that the transferee acquires those
rights and interests which the transferor enjoyed. In short, this analy-
sis suggests that in disputes between buyers and secured parties, Article
7 should govern. It also suggests the obvious: a buyer should not take
subject to rights which accrue after delivery of the document.
On the other hand, application of Article 7 to disputes between
two lenders would run counter to the thrust of section 9-312(1). This
provision catalogs a number of exceptions to its priority rules for dis-
putes between secured parties. It does not list any Article 7 provi-
sion. 192 Application of Article 7 to lender situations also runs counter
to the command of section 9-102 which stipulates that Article 9 applies
to "any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a
security interest in. . .goods."1 93 In Boody, as opposed to the hypo-
thetical, both parties presumably intended to take a security interest in
the wool, rather than buy it. For that reason, and not because of com-
patibility between Article 9 and Article 7, Article 9 governed in Boody.
Thus, there is potential conflict between those two articles, and
resolution of that conflict turns on the function of the receipt.194 If the
receipt is a marketing device, Article 7 or some other buyer protection
rule governs; if it is a financing device, Article 9 governs. 195
191. U.C.C. § 9-201 (emphasis added).
192. Significantly, however, § 9-312(1) does refer to a provision outside Article 9- § 4-
208. On the other hand, it provides that its rules only govern "when applicable." U.C.C. §
9-312(1).
193. U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(a).
194. Indeed, the analysis should be helpful in settings unrelated to the 1972 amend-
ments. It would be strange, for example, to say that a bank holding nonnegotiable receipts
issued to a true owner and transferred to the bank as loan security under § 9-304(3) is the
owner of the goods covered by those receipts. Strict application of § 7-504(l) to that situa-
tion, however, yields that conclusion. Article 9 gives the bank only a security interest and
should control the ownership issue, if it ever arises. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a). Contra,
NYTCO Services, Inc. v. Hurley's Grain Elevator Co., 422 F. Supp. 114, 117 (W.D. Tenn.
1976). Of course, Article 7 would still apply to other rights the bank might enjoy as a
nonqualified holder.
195. This analysis does not apply to disputes between a qualified holder and a secured
party, however. Section 9-309 prohibits application of Article 9 priority rules to qualified
holders whether they are buyers or lenders. See text accompanying notes 92-109 supra.
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Conclusion
Proper analysis of a warehouse receipt holder's rights turns on two
independent inquiries: first, determining whether the holder is a quali-
fied holder, and second, determining within which category of pur-
chaser the holder falls.
In cases involving qualified holders, the Code chooses good faith
purchase treatment. Such holders, whether they take as lenders or as
buyers, take free of all claims, enjoy the full benefit of estoppel, and
defeat prior secured parties whose interests arise at the time of or after
issuance of the receipt. The chief limitation on the rights of the quali-
fied holder lies in section 7-503, which recognizes a class of persons
who defeat the qualified holder. That class consists of persons, true
owners of the goods and secured parties, whose interests arise prior to
issuance of the document. The qualified holder, however, can assert
estoppel arguments against those persons with paramount rights and
may defeat them.
Neither Article 2 nor Article 9 disturbs the framework of Article 7
for maintaining the rights of the qualified holder. In particular, sec-
tion 9-309 does not expand qualified holder protection against prior
secured parties. Section 9-309 applies only to security interests arising
at the time of or after issuance of the receipt.
In cases involving holders who do not qualify for Article 7 good
faith purchase treatment, application of estoppel principles must abide
Article 2 and Article 9 inquiry. Section 7-504, a security of property
rule, limits the rights of a nonqualified holder to those of the transferor.
Such a holder, nonetheless, may be a buyer in ordinary course and
may, therefore, benefit from the good faith purchase rules of Article 2
and Article 9. In the event the holder is not a buyer in ordinary
course, the holder may at least be a buyer and benefit from the protec-
tion of section 9-301(l)(c). In short, the rights of the nonqualified
holder depend on the function of the receipt. If the parties are using it
to market the goods, the taker may benefit from the doctrine of good
faith purchase. If, however, they are using it as a financing device, the
doctrine is unavailable; the rights of the taker depend upon those of the
transferor.
Estoppel is the chief ingredient of good-faith-purchase doctrine. It
provides ample opportunity for commercial lawyers to advance the rule
in favor of purchasers against those prior parties who guard their inter-
ests carelessly. While Articles 2 and 9 restrict application of these argu-
ments for the benefit of buyers out of inventory, Article 7 extends
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opportunities for estoppel to both buyers and lenders, so long as they
are qualified holders.
In general, courts have not grasped the distinctions which govern
the rights of qualified and nonqualified holders and have demonstrated
marked reluctance to give full scope to the impact of estoppel. Those
failures, which may stem from unawareness among commercial law-
yers in general, frustrate the clear policy of the legislature as embodied
in the Code.
